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Bush encroachment is considered to be one of the most extensive forms of degradation
in rangelands in arid and semi-arid regions of the Earth (Sweet 1998, de Klerk 2004,
Joubert et al. 2009, Schr¨ oter et al. 2010). With arid and semi-arid areas covering
about one quarter of the land surface of the Earth, between 50 and 80% of these areas
being used as rangelands, and more than one billion people earning their livelihood
directly from livestock farming in these areas (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005),
bush encroachment is a major worldwide problem. In Namibia, for example, where the
economic well-being of more than two thirds of the population depends directly or
indirectly on agriculture and 65% of the national agricultural output is produced on
commercial rangeland (Mendelssohn et al. 2003), bush encroachment severely restricts
proﬁtability of cattle farming (Espach 2006); the same goes for South Africa (Stuart-Hill
1987, B¨ orner et al. 2007) or Uganda (Mugasi et al. 2000).
From an ecological-economic point of view, rangelands in (semi-)arid regions are sa-
vannahs that are characterized by dynamic interaction and coexistence of woody and
herbaceous vegetation, i.e. bushes and grass, under the inﬂuence of stochastic precipi-
tation and bushﬁre, and that are managed for the purpose of livestock grazing (Knoop
and Walker 1985, Perrings and Walker 1997, Wiegand and Jeltsch 2000, Beukes et al.
2002, Sullivan and Rohde 2002, Janssen et al. 2004, Riginos 2009). The crucial ecosys-
tem service that limits livestock production and shapes farming strategies, is production
of green grass biomass, which serves as a forage for livestock and thus generates farm
income.
Low and highly variable precipitation, which is typical in (semi-)arid regions, causes
a considerable income risk for farmers. The challenge of rangeland management is to
optimally adapt to this highly variable and highly uncertain rainfall, taking into account
ecosystem dynamics. Various grazing management strategies have been developed for
that sake (Westoby et al. 1989, Behnke et al. 1993, Scoones 1994, Heady 1999, Rothauge
2007, Hein and Weikard 2008, Weikard and Hein in press). One such strategy, which is
applied in many good-practice farms in Southern Africa, is to leave a ﬁxed part of the
2pasture ungrazed in years with abundant rainfall (“resting in rainy years”), i.e. stocking
is less than the grazing capacity of the pasture in such a year, while the pasture is used
fully in years with low precipitation. Such conservative grazing management has been
shown to be an eﬃcient strategy for income risk reduction (M¨ uller et al. 2007, Quaas et
al. 2007, M¨ uller et al. 2009, Quaas and Baumg¨ artner 2010).
Ill-adapted grazing management strategies, including over-stocking and suppression
of bushﬁres, are the major anthropogenic causes of bush encroachment, i.e. the persisting
occurrence of an ecosystem state dominated by woody vegetation (Roques et al. 2001,
de Klerk 2004, Joubert et al. 2008).1 Bush encroachment leads to a reduction in the
production of green grass biomass and, thus, to a reduction of grazing capacity of the
rangeland (Sweet 1998, de Klerk 2004, Espach 2006). As a consequence, farm income is
diminished.
Bush encroachment control aims at increasing the long-term carrying capacity of the
pasture through physical, chemical or biological eradication of excessive woody biomass
(“debushing”).2 Generally, as in a savannah system there are not only negative but
also some positive bush-grass interactions (Knoop and Walker 1985, Smit 2005), there
is an optimal density of bushes that makes for the maximum carrying capacity of the
rangeland (de Klerk 2004).3 Hence, debushing is not aimed at complete eradication of
woody biomass, but at reduction of bush density down to the optimal level. As a result
of debushing down to this optimal level, grass biomass production increases signiﬁcantly
in the ﬁrst year (W¨ olbling 2008). Yet, bush encroachment sets in again after three to
1Extreme droughts and climatic change are among the natural causes of bush encroachment.
2Indirect management practices, such as decreasing the stocking rate of livestock in order to recover
the grass cover require a much longer time than direct physical or chemical measures (Valone et al.
2002) and are therefore hardly used.
3For instance, for Namibia this optimal density of bushes can be estimated from the following rule of
thumb (de Klerk 2004: 60): two times the long-term average rainfall (measured in millimeters per year)
in an area yields the optimal number of tree equivalents per hectare in that area, where a tree equivalent
is deﬁned as a tree (shrub) measuring 1.5 m in height (so that e.g. a 3-m shrub would represent 2 tree
equivalents); for example, with a long-term average rainfall of 200 mm/a, some 400 tree equivalents per
hectare would be optimal.
3ﬁve years and grass biomass production drops. If a second round of complete debushing
is then applied after some ten years, the eﬀect of debushing persists for some twenty
years (W¨ olbling 2008, Kr¨ uger and Lubbe 2010).
While the expectation is that, at bottom line, debushing increases a farmer’s in-
come, the exact eﬀect of debushing on the intertemporal stream of farm income and,
in particular, on the variability of income, has not been studied so far. In this paper,
we study the role of debushing for a farmer’s income and income risk in a stochastic
ecological-economic model of grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. In partic-
ular, we study debushing as an instrument of risk management that complements the
choice of an adaptive grazing management strategy for that sake.
We show that debushing, while being a good practice for increasing the mean pasture
productivity and thus expected income, also increases the farmer’s income risk. The
optimal extent of debushing for a risk-averse farmer is thus determined from balancing
the positive and negative consequences of debushing on intertemporal and stochastic
farm income.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the stochastic and
dynamic ecological-economic model, incorporating grazing management and debushing
strategies. Section 3 describes the concepts and tools applied in the model evaluation.
Section 4 presents the results of the study. Section 5 provides a discussion of these
results and draws conclusions.
2 Model
Our analysis is based on an integrated dynamic and stochastic ecological-economic model
which is generic in that it captures essential and general principles of livestock grazing
management in (semi-)arid regions. The basic model was developed in previous analyses
of good-practice examples, in particular Karakul sheep farming in Namibia (M¨ uller et
al. 2007, Quaas et al. 2007, Baumg¨ artner and Quaas 2009, M¨ uller et al. 2009). In this
model, we include here a stylized description of debushing. The basic structure of the
model is presented in Figure 1.
4Figure 1: Basic structure of the model.
Precipitation
The essential exogenous driver of vegetation and livestock dynamics in semi-arid re-
gions, which introduces uncertainty into the system, is precipitation. Precipitation is
modeled as an independently and identically log-normally distributed random variable r































The distribution of rainfall events is right-skewed: events with low rainfall are frequent,
but eventually high-rainfall-events occur. Precipitation is measured in units of eﬀective
rain events per year, that is the number of rain events that are eﬀective in triggering
5plant growth.4 For convenience, a continuous scale is assumed (M¨ uller et al. 2009).
Grazing management
Grazing management is assumed to follow a “resting in rainy years”-strategy, where
the farmer fully stocks in normal or dry years and stocks below the maximum (that
is, gives the pasture a “rest”) in years with high rainfall. Its key feature is that in
dry years, a farmer uses the whole pasture, while in years with suﬃciently high rainfall
levels, a pre-speciﬁed fraction of it is rested. This grazing management strategy can
generically be represented as (γ,r), where γ ∈ [0,1] denotes the fraction of pasture
rested if rainfall exceeds the threshold value r ∈ [0,∞) (Quaas et al. 2007, M¨ uller et al.
2009, Baumg¨ artner and Quaas 2009, Quaas and Baumg¨ artner 2010). These two control
variables determine the fraction gt of pasture that is used for grazing in any given year





1 if rt ≤ r (no resting in normal or dry years)
1 − γ if rt > r (resting in rainy years)
. (4)
The higher the fraction of resting γ and the lower the rain threshold r, the more resting
is applied, that is, the more conservative is the grazing management strategy (M¨ uller
et al. 2007, Quaas et al. 2007).
Debushing
Woody plants are a natural part of dynamic savannah systems, with positive and neg-
ative interactions between woody and herbaceous vegetation, i.e. bushes and grass. It
has been shown that below some optimal density (which depends on long-term average
rainfall),5 bushes may have a positive impact on grass growth, while an increase of bush
4For example, in the (semi-)arid rangeland system of Namibia with mean annual precipitation of
180 mm/a, rain events of more than 15 mm/day are eﬀective in this sense.
5For example, in the (semi-)arid rangeland system of Namibia with mean annual precipitation of
180 mm/a, the optimal bush density is 360 tree equivalents per hectare according to the rule of thumb
of de Klerk (2004: 60).
6density above this level leads to signiﬁcant suppression of green grass biomass produc-
tion and, thus, the rangeland’s grazing capacity for livestock (de Klerk 2004: 58–62,
111–126).
In line with these stylized facts, we measure bush encroachment as the excess amount
B of bushes over the optimal amount of bushes that yields the highest carrying capacity
K (namely for B = 0). For B > 0 there is a negative relationship between bush
encroachment B and carrying capacity of the pasture (Figure 2). If, for example, the
Figure 2: Dependence of carrying capacity on the amount of bushes (based on Stuart-
Hill (1987) and de Klerk (2004: 58–62, 111–126)). B denotes the excess amount of bushes
over the optimal amount of bushes, K the maximal achievable carrying capacity (for
B = 0), and B0 and K0 the initial amount of bushes and the initial carrying capacity,
respectively.
initial level of bush encroachment is B0, which corresponds to a carrying capacity of
K0 < K, debushing, i.e. a decrease of B, increases the resulting carrying capacity.
We assume that the farmer can directly choose, as another management variable be-
sides the grazing management strategy, the fraction κ ∈ [0,1] of bush removal, i.e. the
fraction of the excess amount B of bushes over the optimal amount of bushes which is
7actually removed. We assume a linear relationship between the amount of bush removal
and resulting increase of carrying capacity of the pasture, and normalize units appropri-
ately, so that κ · B is the increase in carrying capacity of the pasture. Furthermore, we
assume that all debushing takes place in the ﬁrst year and that the increased carrying
capacity due to debushing persists at the initial level throughout the whole time horizon.
While debushing a fraction of κ of the excess amount of bushes over the optimal
amount of bushes generates the beneﬁt of increased carrying capacity of the pasture, it
also implies costs. We assume that the farmer incurs annualized costs of κ · C, where
C > 0 are the constant marginal costs of debushing. Part of the annualized costs of
debushing can be regarded as the down-payment of a sui generis loan, that a farmer
takes up initially in order to pay for the initial one-time increase in carrying capacity.6
Another part of the annualized total costs of debushing consists of the average annual
costs that a farmer faces for keeping the pasture’s carrying capacity on the debushed
level.
Ecosystem dynamics
Grass vegetation dynamics are modeled by two variables that describe the two com-
ponents of a single (representative) species of perennial grass: green biomass Gt which
describes the photosynthetic organs of the plants that serve as forage for livestock;
and reserve biomass Rt which describes non-photosynthetic organs that do not serve as
forage (Baumg¨ artner and Quaas 2009, M¨ uller et al. 2009).
Figure 1 presents the interaction of all ﬁve principal components of pasture vegetation
dynamics, namely of green and reserve biomass, climate, livestock and bushes. Livestock
is determined by grazing on green biomass, thus inﬂuencing the vegetation dynamics.
The quantity of green biomass in any given year is determined by the actual amount of
precipitation in that year and by the reserve biomass that has accumulated under the
rain history and grazing history in previous years. The dynamics of green and reserve
biomass are also inﬂuenced by competition with woody vegetation, which may suppress
6In fact, many debushing measures in Namibia are ﬁnanced by loans.
8the growth of grass vegetation, thus decreasing the carrying capacity of the pasture for
livestock.
The amount Gt of green biomass (ﬂow variable) available in year t after the end of
the growing season is given by
Gt = wG · rt · Rt , (5)
where the parameter wG is a conversion parameter, indicating the extent to which green
biomass Gt responds to reserve biomass Rt and current plant-available precipitation rt.
The dynamics of the reserve biomass (stock variable) are described by the following
stochastic diﬀerence equation:




K − (1 − κ) · B









where d is the constant intrinsic death rate, and wR is the constant intrinsic growth
rate, of reserve biomass. A density dependence of reserve biomass growth is captured
by the factors containing the maximal achievable carrying capacity K: the higher the
accumulated reserve biomass, the slower it grows. The parameter c ∈ [0,1] describes
the factor by which reserve biomass growth is reduced due to grazing pressure.
Herd size and farm income
The farmer’s annual income is given by the revenues from selling livestock products
such as meat, milk, fur and wool. This income is assumed to arise in proportion to the
number St of livestock on the farm in that year, with the current price for livestock
products as the factor of proportionality. With Gt (Equation 5) as the amount of green
biomass available in year t, and taking into account the grazing management strategy
(γ,r) which in year t leads to a fraction gt (Equation 4) of available green biomass used
for grazing, the total number of livestock (herd size) St in year t is given by:
St = gt · Gt . (7)
9Assuming that the price for livestock products is constant, and normalizing it appropri-
ately, gross income in any year t simply equals the number St of livestock in that year.
Net income yt contains in addition the annual costs of debushing, with marginal costs
C. Thus, net income yt in year t is
yt = St − κ · C = gt · Gt − κ · C . (8)
Since the herd size St is a random variable, annual income yt is also a random variable.
Farmer’s preferences and behavior
The farmer’s preferences over the uncertain stream of present and future income {yt}T
t=1









where u(yt) is the instantaneous utility obtained in year t from actual current income yt,
and δ > 0 is the farmer’s utility discount rate. The higher δ, the more impatient is the
farmer. The expectation operator E[·] takes the mean over the probability distribution








where θ > 0 is the constant degree of relative risk aversion.7 The higher θ, the more
risk averse is the farmer.
The farmer is assumed to maximize expected intertemporal utility U (Equations 9
and 10) over the three control variables γ ∈ [0,1], r ∈ [0,∞) and κ ∈ [0,1], and subject
to the dynamics of the coupled ecological-economic system:
max
γ,r,κ U subject to (4),(5),(6),(8) . (11)
Parameter values
Table 1 shows the parameter values used in the numerical analysis. The values of the
7As function (10) is not deﬁned for θ = 1, we deﬁne u(·) by (10) for θ 6= 1, and by the continuous
extension of (10) for θ = 1, which is u(yt) = logyt.
10Table 1: Parameter set and parameter values
Parameters Values
Ecological Growth rate of green biomass wG 1.2
conditions Growth rate of reserve biomass wR 0.2
Mortality rate of reserve biomass d 0.15
Impact of grazing c 0.5
Initial reserve biomass R0 1.0
Maximal attainable carrying capacity K 48.0
Excess amount of bushes B 40.0
Climatic Mean annual rainfall E[r] 1.2
conditions Standard deviation of annual rainfall Sd[r] 0.7
Economic Risk aversion θ 2.0
parameters Discount rate δ 0.1
Time horizon T 15
Marginal annualized costs of debushing C 0.04
ecological parameters wG, wR, d, c, R0, K and B follow M¨ uller et al. (2007, 2009).
The values of K and B have been modiﬁed from the values used by M¨ uller et al. (2007,
2009) according to the assumption that, starting from the current state of the rangeland,
complete debushing will increase the carrying-capacity for livestock by a factor of ﬁve
(W¨ olbling 2008). The values of the climatic parameters E[r] and Sd[r] are taken from
Sandford (1982). The values of risk aversion θ, time horizon T and discount rate δ are
conforming well to the model peculiarities, and are in the range of values found in an
empirical survey of commercial cattle farmers in Namibia (Olbrich et al. 2009). The value
of the marginal annualized costs C of debushing has been derived from information on
the one-time costs of physical debushing being in the range of 200–800 Namibian dollars
per hectare (W¨ olbling 2008, Horsthemke 2010, Kr¨ uger and Lubbe 2010), by annualizing
over the time horizon T and transforming unities appropriately.
113 Concepts and tools of model evaluation
Solving the stochastic maximization problem (11) yields the optimal grazing manage-
ment strategy (γ∗,r∗) and the optimal fraction of debushing (κ∗). If the farmer applies
these under stochastic precipitation, an ex-ante uncertain income stream y = {yt}T
t=1
will result. In the following, we describe what concepts we use to obtain and evaluate
this uncertain income stream.
Expected present value of uncertain income stream









Here, we use the utility discount rate δ as an income discount rate.
Coeﬃcient of variation of reserve biomass and income at the end of the
time-horizon
As a measure of volatility, we calculate the coeﬃcient of reserve-biomass variation CVR
and of annual-income variation CVy at the end of the time-horizon T as the ratio of
standard deviation to mean (i.e. expected) reserve biomass Rt (6) in year t = T and









where Rt and yt are obtained as the optimal solution to maximization problem (11)
for a given time horizon T. When doing the maximization (11) only over the grazing
management strategy (γ,r), but not over the extent of debushing κ, one obtains the
coeﬃcients of variation CVR and CVy as functions of κ. They are a measure of relative
dispersion in probability distributions. Therefore, they can be regarded as a measure
of relative objective risk of a certain extent of debushing κ. As the coeﬃcient of varia-
12tion does not take into account the farmer’s subjective risk aversion, they fall short of
adequately measuring the subjectively valued risk, which is relevant for decision-making
Intertemporal certainty equivalent of an uncertain income stream
In an intertemporal and stochastic setting, one can deﬁne the intertemporal certainty
equivalent YCE of the uncertain income stream y as the present value of a certain and
constant payment stream over the entire time horizon t = 1,...,T which generates the
same expected intertemporal utility as the uncertain income stream. With (9) and







(1 − θ)(1 + δ)t−1
#
. (15)
The certain and constant annual payment yCE which generates the same intertemporal






(1 − θ)(1 + δ)t−1 , (16)
which can be solved for8
yCE =
"








This is the amount of money that, when payed for sure in each year over the entire
time horizon t = 1,...,T, generates the same intertemporal utility as the expected
intertemporal utility from the uncertain income stream y. The intertemporal certainty











(1 + δ)t−1 , (18)
where yCE is deﬁned by Equations (17) and (15).









13Intertemporal risk premium of an uncertain income stream
The intertemporal risk premium π of the uncertain income stream y can be deﬁned
as the diﬀerence between the expected net present value, YE, and the intertemporal
certainty equivalent, YCE, of the uncertain income stream y:9
π = YE − YCE , (19)
where YE and YCE are deﬁned by Equations (12) and (18), respectively. The risk
premium π values, in monetary terms, the risk associated with the uncertain income
stream y compared to the certain and constant payment stream yCE that generates the
same expected intertemporal utility to a risk-averse farmer. With this understanding
of the risk premium, one may say that debushing provides natural insurance if the risk
premium π decreases with the fraction of debushing κ.
Total net value of debushing
While debushing may have an impact on the income risk of a risk-averse farmer, which
is measured by the change in the risk premium π (Equation 19), it may also aﬀect the
expected income, YE (Equation 12). In order to measure the total net value of debushing
to a risk-averse farmer, taking into account both eﬀects, we therefore calculate the
farmer’s willingness to pay for debushing when debushing comes at annual marginal
costs of C (hence: “net” value). A positive total net value indicates that the farmer
would prefer debushing (at annual marginal costs C) over not debushing.
In order to calculate the farmer’s willingness to pay for debushing, we compare
the uncertain income stream y = {yt}T
t=1 that results from applying the optimal graz-
ing management strategy (γ∗,r∗) and the optimal fraction of debushing (κ∗) with the
uncertain income stream y0 = {y0
t}T
t=1 that would result from applying the grazing man-
agement strategy (γ0,r0) that solves the stochastic maximization problem (11) if the
9Lau (2008) suggests a more demanding concept of “risk premium” in an intertemporal context,
based on an attempt to explicitly and generally disentangle risk aversion from intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in the decision maker’s preferences. Yet, with Lau’s concept one arrives at basically the
same results (Result 1 in Section 4) as with our simpler concept.
14fraction of debushing was exogenously set to zero in (11), (6) and (8) (κ = 0, “not
debushing”).
Let v ∈ [0,1] denote the constant relative fraction of net income that a debushing
farmer is willing to pay in each year for maintaining the rangeland’s carrying capacity
on the debushed level. We can determine v by setting equal the expected utility of the
optimally debushing farmer, taking into account the constant relative fraction of income















(1 − θ) · (1 + δ)t−1
#
. (20)
Solving for v yields:10

























This is a risk-averse farmer’s willingness to pay for debushing, i.e. for maintaining the
rangeland’s carrying capacity on the debushed level at constant annual marginal costs
of C, expressed as a constant relative fraction of net income to be payed in each year.
The expected net present value of debushing, V , is then given by the expected net
present value of the payment stream that results if in each year a constant fraction v of















= v YE , (22)
where v is given by Equation (21). The higher V , the more a farmer prefers debushing
over not-debushing.
10For θ = 1, v is given by:



















15Simulation and optimization method
To simulate the present model, speciﬁc MATLAB (version R2009a) code has been de-
veloped. The MATLAB routine patternsearch, which is a Direct Search algorithm, has
proven to be most eﬃcient and robust for solving the current stochastic, discretized
optimization problem. Pattern search operates by searching a set of points called a
pattern, which expands or shrinks depending on whether any point within the pattern
has a lower objective function value than the current point. The search stops after
a minimum pattern size is reached. The algorithm does not use derivatives to deter-
mine descent, and so it works well on nondiﬀerentiable, stochastic, and discontinuous
objective functions (Audet and Dennis 2003).
To approximate the continuous rainfall probability distribution, N = 100000000 rain-
fall proﬁles over T years have been simulated. The sensitivity analysis is performed
on the risk aversion coeﬃcient θ, on the discount rate δ, on the standard deviation of
rainfall Sd[r] and the fraction of debushing κ, if debushing is regarded as exogenous
variable and not optimally determined by the farmer.
4 Results
Result 1: Debushing increases reserve-biomass variation, income variation
and the risk premium of income
Figure 3 shows that the coeﬃcient of variation of both reserve biomass CVR (Equa-
tion 13) and income CVy (Equation 14) at the end of the time horizon T increases with
the fraction κ of debushing for all time horizons (T = 1, T = 5 and T = 15). That
is, debushing increases the relative variation of both reserve biomass and income in the
future.
The reason is that mean reserve biomass and mean income increase less with the ex-
tent of debushing than the corresponding standard deviation. The removal of a fraction
κ of bushes raises the actual carrying capacity, which is given by K−(1−κ)·B, and con-
sequently the reserve biomass (6) and income (8), which has the following consequences:








































































































Figure 3: The coeﬃcient of variation of (a) reserve biomass CVR and (b) income CVy at
the end of the time horizon T as a function of the debushing fraction κ for time-horizons
T = 1, T = 5 and T = 15 years. All other parameter values as in Table 1.
17it reduces the adverse deterministic impact of the mortality of reserve biomass (i), the
impact of grazing pressure on reserve biomass (ii) and partially the stochastic impact
of precipitation on reserve biomass (iii). Given that the green biomass Gt (Equation 5)
is given as the product of reserve biomass Rt (Equation 6), the rainfall level rt and
a deterministic growth parameter wG, the increased reserve biomass leads to a higher
and more volatile green biomass (iv). Through a feedback mechanism (Equation 6), the
higher green biomass Gt generates a more volatile reserve biomass Rt, as the increased
green biomass eﬀect is dominating the partial volatility reducing eﬀect of the increased
carrying capacity in the reserve biomass process (v). As income yt (Equation 8) de-
pends linearly on green biomass Gt, all these channels generate ﬁnally a higher and
more volatile annual income yt.
Overall, the coeﬃcient of income variation is a lot higher than that of reserve-biomass
variation for all time horizons (Figure 3 a and b). That is, the relative variation of income
is a lot higher than that of reserve biomass. This is plausible, because reserve biomass
is a stock quantity which buﬀers ﬂuctuations, whereas income is a ﬂow quantity that is
in each year directly determined by, inter alia, stochastic precipitation.
Figure 3(a) shows further that the coeﬃcient of reserve biomass variation is the
higher, the higher the time horizon. The reason for this is that the standard deviation
of the time-dependent stochastic reserve biomass increases, while the expected reserve
biomass decreases, as a function of time. In contrast, Figure 3(b) shows that the co-
eﬃcient of income variation depends on the time horizon in a non-monotonic manner.
Figure 4 shows in more detail how the coeﬃcients of variation of reserve biomass and
of income depend on the time horizon if there is no debushing (κ = 0). While the
coeﬃcient of variation of reserve biomass at the end of the time horizon monotonically
increases with the time horizon, the coeﬃcient of variation of income at the end of the
time horizon depends on the time horizon in a non-monotonic manner: it monotonically
decreases for time horizons up to T = 9 years, where it reaches a minimum, and from
then on monotonically increases with the time horizon.
The reason for this result is the following. As Figure 5(a) shows, for reserve biomass
RT at the end of the time horizon the expected value monotonically decreases and the






























































































Figure 4: The coeﬃcient of variation of (a) reserve biomass CVR and (b) income CVy at
the end of the time horizon T as a function of the time horizon T if there is no debushing
(κ = 0). All other parameter values as in Table 1.
19standard deviation monotonically increases, so that the coeﬃcient of variation obviously
decreases with the time horizon T. In contrast, for the annual income yT at the end




























































Figure 5: The standard deviation and expected value of (a) reserve biomass RT and of
(b) income yT at the end of the time horizon T as a function of the time horizon T if
there is no debushing (κ = 0). All other parameter values as in Table 1.
of the time horizon, both the expected value and the standard deviation monotonically
decrease with the time horizon T (Figure 5b). However, the marginal decrease of the
standard deviation is non-monotonic, which obviously then leads to a non-monotonic
coeﬃcient of variation for income as a function of the time horizon.
Figure 6 shows that the higher the fraction of debushing κ, the higher the risk pre-
mium π (Equation 19) of the resulting uncertain income stream. That means, not only
does the coeﬃcient of variation of future income increase with debushing (Figure 3b),
but also the subjectively valued income risk, which takes into account risk aversion and
time preference, increases with debushing. Therefore, debushing does not provide nat-
ural insurance to a risk-averse farmer but, just to the contrary, it increases a risk-averse

























Figure 6: Risk premium π as a function of the debushing fraction κ for two diﬀerent
degrees of risk aversion, θ = 0.5 and θ = 2.0. All other parameter values as in Table 1.
farmer’s subjective risk. The reason is that the additional expected income generated by
debushing is relatively too low to compensate for the increased income volatility, which
leads to an increasing risk premium.
Figure 6 also shows that the risk premium as well as the increase in the risk premium
are the higher, the higher the degree of risk aversion θ.
Result 2: Debushing increases the expected net present value of income and
the willingness to pay for debushing
Figure 7 shows (a) the expected net present value of income YE (Equation 12) and
(b) the willingness to pay for debushing V (Equation 22) as a function of the fraction
of debushing κ for two diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion, θ = 0.5 and θ = 2.0. The
maximum of the expected net present value of income is reached at κmax = 0.95 for
θ = 0.5 and κmax = 0.9 for θ = 2.0 (Figure 7a). The reason that expected net present
value of income reaches a maximum at some level of debushing is a combination of the







































































































Figure 7: (a) Expected net present value of income YE and (b) willingness to pay for
debushing V as a function of the fraction of debushing κ for two diﬀerent degrees of risk
aversion, θ = 0.5 and θ = 2.0. All other parameter values as in Table 1.
22following two features: (i) debushing comes at constant marginal costs, so that the total
costs increase linearly with the level of debushing; (ii) gross income increases with the
level of debushing, but less than linearly because of how ecosystem dynamics translates
stochastic precipitation in green biomass.
The maximum of the willingness to pay for debushing is reached at κmax = 0.8 for
θ = 0.5 and κmax = 0.65 for θ = 2.0 (Figure 7b).11 For all levels of debushing κ, the
higher the degree of risk aversion θ, the lower the expected net present value of income
and the lower the willingness to pay for debushing.
Result 3: Debushing implies more conservative grazing management
Figure 8 shows the optimal grazing management strategy, i.e. the optimal fraction of
resting γ? (Figure 8a) and the optimal rain threshold r? (Figure 8b), as a function
of the fraction of debushing κ for two diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion, θ = 0.5 and
θ = 2.0. The higher the level of debushing, the more conservative the optimal grazing
management strategy, i.e. the higher the optimal fraction of resting γ? and the lower
the optimal rain threshold r?.
There are two reasons behind this result. First, debushing generates a higher ex-
pected income, and with a higher expected income, a farmer rests more. Second, de-
bushing increases income risk in the sense that it increases the risk premium (Result 1),
and conservative grazing management provides natural insurance in the sense that it
reduces the risk premium (Quaas et al. 2007, Quaas and Baumg¨ artner 2010), so that a
risk-averse farmer will counteract the increased risk from additional debushing by ap-
plying natural insurance through more conservative grazing management. For a higher
degree of risk aversion (θ = 2), the grazing management strategy is therefore more
conservative than for lower risk aversion (θ = 0.5).
11Note that the fraction of debushing κmax which maximizes the expected net present value of income
YE or the willingness to pay for debushing V will, in general, not coincide with the optimal debushing
fraction κ? that maximizes the expected intertemporal utility U (Equation 9).
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Figure 8: The optimal grazing management strategy, i.e. the optimal fraction of resting
γ? (a) and the optimal rain threshold r? (b), as a function of the fraction of debushing
κ for two diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion, θ = 0.5 and θ = 2.0. All other parameter
values as in Table 1.
24Result 4: Risk aversion, rainfall volatility and discounting decrease the op-
timal fraction of debushing
Figures 9 and 10 show the optimal fraction of debushing κ? as a function of the degree
of risk aversion θ (Figure 9a), of the standard deviation of rainfall Sd[r] (Figure 9b),
and of the discount rate δ (Figure 10). Apparently, risk aversion, rainfall volatility and

















































































Figure 9: The optimal fraction of debushing κ? as a function of the degree of risk
aversion θ (a) and of the standard deviation of rainfall Sd[r] (b). All other parameter
values as in Table 1.
discounting all decrease the optimal fraction of debushing.
Figure 9(a) shows that a higher degree of risk aversion θ implies a lower optimal
fraction of debushing κ?. The reason is that a higher fraction of debushing implies a
higher income volatility, which a more risk-averse farmer seeks to avoid more strongly.
Figure 9(b) shows that under increased environmental risk (as measured by a higher
standard deviation of precipitation Sd[r]), the optimal fraction of debushing κ? de-
creases. The reason is that a higher precipitation volatility generates a more volatile
reserve biomass, a more volatile income, and, eventually, a higher risk premium. As





































Figure 10: The optimal fraction of debushing κ? as a function of the discount rate δ.
All other parameter values as in Table 1.
already seen, the risk premium can be reduced by reducing the fraction of debushing
(Result 1). Therefore, a risk-averse and optimizing farmer reduces the fraction of de-
bushing to counteract the increase in income risk resulting from higher environmental
risk. Figure 10 shows that an increase of the discount rate δ leads to a lower optimal
fraction of debushing κ?. The reason is that a higher discount rate decreases the invest-
ment motive for debushing, as future income streams are weighted less in comparison
to present ones.
5 Discussion and conclusion
We have analyzed the role of debushing for a farmer’s income in a stochastic ecological-
economic model of grazing management in semi-arid rangelands. Starting from a stan-
dard rangeland-management model, we have modeled debushing as a one-time action
that permanently increases the carrying capacity of the pasture and carries annual costs.
As for the farmer’s preferences, we have assumed constant relative risk aversion, a con-
26stant rate of pure time preference, and maximization of expected intertemporal utility.
Our central result is that debushing increases the volatility of both reserve biomass
and income in the future, and it increases the risk premium to a risk-averse farmer, that
is the valued subjective intertemporal income risk. Yet, it also increases the expected net
present value of income. The optimal extent of debushing for a risk-averse farmer is thus
determined from balancing these two impacts. We ﬁnd that the higher the farmer’s risk
aversion or impatience, and the higher the environmental risk (measured as the standard
deviation of precipitation), the smaller the optimal fraction of debushing. We further
ﬁnd that the higher the fraction of debushing, the more conservative is the optimal
grazing management strategy, that is the more resting is optimal.
The main driver of these results is that in our model debushing causes, ﬁrst of all,
an increase in the carrying capacity of the pasture and, consequently, an increase in the
mean level of reserve biomass. But then, the linear dependence of the green biomass
on the reserve biomass leads to a higher green biomass volatility if the reserve biomass
gets larger. For high levels of debushing, the increase in the volatility of green biomass
production (and, hence, income) dominates over the increase in the mean level of green
biomass production (and, hence, income), so that a risk-averse farmer will ﬁnd some
limited extent of debushing to be optimal.
Another determinant of the optimal extent of debushing is the structure of costs.
While we have assumed constant marginal costs of debushing, there exists in general no
interior solution to the optimization problem if – ceteris paribus – the marginal costs
are zero. In that case, it would for a wide range of parameter values be optimal to fully
debush the pasture.
Our results have high relevance for environmental and development policy in regions
where farmers face high environmental risk, e.g. from uncertain precipitation, and rely
on their farming practices for natural insurance, e.g. through conservative grazing man-
agement. Here, we have shown that while debushing will improve the (expected) state
of the environment, it also imposes an income risk on the farmer. A risk-averse and
optimizing farmer will therefore debush only to a limited extent. It would therefore be
desirable, from a combined environment-and-development perspective, to supply farmers
27with adequate means of actuarially fair ﬁnancial insurance against their environmentally
induced farm-income risk. For, farmers with access to such ﬁnancial insurance would
have an incentive to debush and thus improve the state of the environment, and would
– for the same level of expected monetary income – enjoy a higher level of expected
welfare.
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